Published in Physics Today, 45(7), 15, 1992 ((c) American Institute of Physics). Note: this material is subject to copyright restrictions and may not be used for for any commercial purpose without the permission of the copyright owner. If it is transmitted, copied or printed, then this notice, any other information herein relating to copyright, and author and publisher names, must be included in the derivative material (except for the case of brief quotes for the purposes of review or research). Philip Anderson (October 1991, page 146), says 'within my competence as a theorist, physics as it is practised, and specifically precise mensuration, is not compatible with Jahn's claims' (that is, claims of the existence of psychokinesis). His idea is, no doubt, that, if mind affected matter, this would disturb the results of laboratory experiments. An equivalent argument could be applied to chemistry, and would lead one to the following: 'chemistry as it is practised rests on the principle of the invariance of atoms, and so is incompatible with the idea that elements can be transmuted'. The latter conclusion is not, I suspect, one whose truth Anderson would be as eager to assert in the columns of Physics Today as the one, quoted above, that he did assert. Equally suspect is Anderson's second argument designed to persuade his readers to disregard Jahn's results, that is his reference to the use of Bayesian statistical methods. I am willing to accept his claim that the use of such methods would make Jahn's numbers much less favourable. But unfortunately the argument stops short at that point; Anderson does not inform us what the result would be if Bayesian methods were applied, and especially does not tell us the answer to the crucial question: do Jahn's results remain significant if this analysis is done, or not? Why this reticence? For Anderson, and for other sceptics, belief in the paranormal is irrational. But very often sceptics, in their uncritical attempts to persuade others of their point of view, fall back on inadequate arguments themselves. Those examined above provide clear illustrations of this fact. What, then, about irrationality? Is it irrational to assert that under special conditions psychokinesis can occur, although most of the time it does not? No more irrational, I think, than to assert that while for most people walking on a tightrope across a ravine is an impossible task, it may nevertheless be possible under sufficiently favourable conditions (such as suitable dedication, training and concentration); again, I suggest, no more irrational than to assert that while an amount of uranium of mass of the order of a kilogram generates spontaneously an amount of heat requiring sensitive instruments to detect at all, a suitably larger amount can generate enough energy to provide power for a large city (further, as has been noted by one of my collaborators, social anthropologist and parapsychologist Marilyn Schlitz of the Mind Science Foundation, San Antonio, Texas, there exist analogies that may be more directly relevant in the field of social systems, an example being the way under special conditions in a society particular ideas that individuals have may spread widely, although in the vast majority of cases the effects of individuals' ideas remain localised close to their source). Finally, is it really irrational or unscientific, as some sceptics seem to think, to suggest that a relationship may exist between Bell's non-local connections and telepathy? In this regard, I wish to draw attention to the publication in a reputable physics journal of a paper (B.D. Josephson and F. Pallikari-Viras, Found. Phys. 21, 197-207, 1991) which gives a rational account of how the two could be related, and of why the latter kind of coupling should be possible in biosystems but not under the conditions of the normal physics experiment. I hope that some readers may by now have picked up a message that sceptics might prefer that they did not pick up; that (i) psychic phenomena may be both consistent with physics, and conceivable in rational terms; and (ii), as a corollary of (i), that many of the experiments on the paranormal may be measuring genuine phenomena, which it should be the goal of science to try to understand. Finally, I should like to recommend to readers not wanting to be caught in a paradigm that may be outliving its relevance to our understanding of the natural world, that they read David Bohm's elegant discussion of his concept soma-significance (see The Search for Meaning, ed. P. Pylkkaenen, Crucible, Wellingborough, Northants., England, 1989, pp. 43-62).