 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Let us take an example which shows the logic of frequentistic 
inference and why the use of reasonable prior distributions 
yields results which 
that frame classifies as distorted.
Imagine meeting a hunting dog in the country. Let us assume we
know that there is a  probability 
of finding  the dog within a radius of 100 m centred 
on the position of the hunter (this is our likelihood). 
Where is the hunter? He is with
 probability 
of finding  the dog within a radius of 100 m centred 
on the position of the hunter (this is our likelihood). 
Where is the hunter? He is with  probability
within a radius of 100 m around the position of the dog,
with equal probability in all directions. ``Obvious''. 
This is exactly the
logic scheme used in the frequentistic approach to
 build confidence regions from the estimator (the dog in this
 example). This however assumes that the hunter can be anywhere
 in the country. But now let us change the state of information:
 ``the dog is by a river''; ``the dog has collected a duck and
 runs in a certain direction''; ``the dog is sleeping''; 
 ``the dog is in a field surrounded by a fence through which he
 can pass without problems, but the hunter cannot''. Given 
 any new condition the conclusion changes. 
 Some of the new conditions change our likelihood, but 
 some others only influence the initial distribution. 
 For example, the case of the dog in an enclosure 
 inaccessible to the hunter is exactly the problem encountered
 when measuring a quantity close to the edge of its physical region,
 which is quite common in frontier research.
 probability
within a radius of 100 m around the position of the dog,
with equal probability in all directions. ``Obvious''. 
This is exactly the
logic scheme used in the frequentistic approach to
 build confidence regions from the estimator (the dog in this
 example). This however assumes that the hunter can be anywhere
 in the country. But now let us change the state of information:
 ``the dog is by a river''; ``the dog has collected a duck and
 runs in a certain direction''; ``the dog is sleeping''; 
 ``the dog is in a field surrounded by a fence through which he
 can pass without problems, but the hunter cannot''. Given 
 any new condition the conclusion changes. 
 Some of the new conditions change our likelihood, but 
 some others only influence the initial distribution. 
 For example, the case of the dog in an enclosure 
 inaccessible to the hunter is exactly the problem encountered
 when measuring a quantity close to the edge of its physical region,
 which is quite common in frontier research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
