Part of the lectures was given using
traditional slides, which have been later scanned
(only those actually shown). Here there are
some interesting sets.
- Even frequentistic gurus have hard time not to speak
about the “probability”
of a true value to be in a interval
(Presented in the first lecture, slide )
- Overview about the meaning
of the Higgs lower limits reported by LEP
(Presented in the first lecture, slide p. 62;
for a related paper see talk at MaxEnt98)
- Do you want the Higgs found next year?
- Holy inquisition style of a CERN frequentitic guru
- The (in-)famous HERA events
(See also my antiplublication)
- From general, Bayesian reasoning to Maximum Likelihood
- Why do p-values 'often' work?
-  F. James and M. Roos,
Errors on Ratios of Small Numbers of Events
-  A.L. Read,
frequentist analysis of search results (The CL(s) method)
-  In the last lecture of a
Academic Training (25-29 May 1998),
Fred James stood up and asked if he could
show a slide,
showing the first page of a paper by J.O. Berger and D.A. Berry,
with highlighted some sentences from the body of the paper.
Then I asked me solemny to answer if I agreed or not with
the highlighted sentences. I answered positively.
After more than one week (see date stamped by the receiver)
he sent me a fax requiring me to give a written answer,
by fax, if really agreed with the sentences! And I did it.
What was his problem? A well known
(by those who like a little bit) flaw of the p-values is that
the conclusions do not depend only on what has been really obserbed,
but also on other things less probable than what it has actually
been observed, but that are not observed. Now the
ignorant and arrogant 'guru, in his great confusion, thought that
the statements from Berger and Berry paper meant that we
are not allawed to use Monte Carlo 'data' in our analysis.
Indeed is the other way around, MC 'data' should be used
in a Bayesian approach, because one forms his beliefs on simulation,
and there extend them to the real detector. Instead,
that problem is present in a framework
approach in one can speak of probability only if they are related
to long run relatve frequencies of real events!
- J.O. Berger and D.A. Berry, Statistical analysis and the
illusion of objectivity, Am. Scientist 76 (1988) 159
(a scanned version is available here)